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ABSTRACT 
 
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE TELECOM 
INDUSTRY IN ETHIOPIA 
 
By 
 
GEBREGZIABHER, Ermias Haile 
 
 
Ethiopia received the telephone technology seventeen years after its invention in the world. 
Owing to a number of constraints, however, the telecom sector’s performance has not been 
remarkable even by the standards of Africa. The telecom sector in Ethiopia has been 
characterized by a vertically integrated market run by a state-owned enterprise outside the 
realm of competition and the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation has a monopoly 
over all telecom services. This monopolistic structure has resulted in limited access to and 
poor quality of services in all telecommunications services. Institutionally, the three basic 
functions (industrial policies, regulation, and operation) have not been separated. Solving 
these and other related problems would require that the Ethiopian government introduce 
competition into the sector, remove all institutional hurdles that prevented the sector from 
growing, build the legitimacy of the regulator, enhance human resources capacity, make it 
more responsive to the ever growing consumer needs. The purpose of this study was to assess 
the industrial policies the government seeks to achieve by running a public telecom 
monopoly and critically assesses whether introducing some form of competition would 
improve the efficiency and accessibility of telecom services. 
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Ethiopia is a federally organized country with about 80 million people, characterized by a 
wide range of ecological and climatic conditions. It covers a total area of 1.10 million square 
kilometers and is landlocked in East Africa between the Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, 
and Kenya, all of which (other than Eritrea and Somalia) have a substantial information and 
communication infrastructure. Many parts of the country are isolated due to mountainous 
terrain and weak road infrastructure. Nearly 80% of the population (63 million) lives in rural 
areas and is dependent on agriculture. The share of the rural population within two kilometers 
of an all-season road is about 17% (Adam, 2007). 
Figure 1. Ethiopia (map) 
 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook 
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This agrarian setting poses a significant challenge to the delivery of affordable 
communications. Being one of the world’s least developed nations with a GDP per capita of 
about US $402 (2008/09)
i, Ethiopia’s economy has had to respond to the ongoing impact of 
drought and problems of poverty and disease. The country faces security challenges with its 
neighbors, particularly with Somalia and Eritrea (formerly part of Ethiopia). The poverty 
cycle has put a significant strain on its economic growth. Its GDP growing at an average of 
10% per annum, the Economist has predicted Ethiopia’s economy to be the fifth fastest 
growing economy in the world by the end of 2010 (Sudan Tribune, 2009). The service sector 
is now clearly at top, comprising 45.1 percent of GDP, followed by agriculture at 43.2 
percent, and Industry at just 13.0 percent. The customary shorthand description of the 
Ethiopian economy—as being overwhelmingly agriculture-based—has thus just become 
obsolete (The Ethiopia Macroeconomic Handbook 2010). 
 
The telecommunications sector in Ethiopia has been characterized by a vertically integrated 
market run by a state-owned enterprise outside the realm of competition and the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) has a monopoly over all telecom services. So far, 
owing to a number of problems, the sector’s performance has been very poor even by the 
standards of Africa. 
 
In the last couple of years, there have been fierce debates in Ethiopia as to whether 
liberalizing the telecom sector would be a panacea for the long standing telecommunication 
problems in the country. While a number of researchers and donor organizations are 
convinced that liberalization is the only way out, the government has been reluctant to open 
up the sector holding that “liberalization will not result in positive net changes to poor people 
due to the profit motives of the multinational companies that are interested in the cream of 
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telecom market” (Adam 2007). But rather than directly starting with the ‘cart’ (proposed 
solution), it is worth starting with the ‘horse’ and investigate into what the industrial policies 
are the Ethiopian government seeks to achieve by running a public monopoly in the telecom 
market and see if these policy objectives could really be achieved by the private sector. 
 
This paper assesses the industrial policies and regulatory framework surrounding the 
telecommunications industry in Ethiopia and whether the existence of more competition in 
the sector would make telecommunications services more efficient and easily accessible. 
 
1.2 Historical Background 
 
According to company history, Ethiopia received the telephone technology in 1894, 
seventeen years after its invention in the world. Gradually, the technological scheme was 
proved to contribute to the integration of the Ethiopian society when the extensive open wire 
line system was laid out linking the Ethiopian capital city with all the important 
administrative towns of the country (ETC official website). 
 
The company was placed under government control at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
and was later brought to operate under the auspices of the Ministry of Post and 
Communications. In 1952, telecommunications services were separated from postal 
administration, and structured under the Ministry of Transport and Communications. By this 
proclamation, a telecommunication entity, called “Ethiopian Telecommunication Board” 
which exclusively regulates and operates telecommunication services was established. 
Without affecting its functions, the name was later changed to Ethiopian Telecommunication 
Authority. 
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The Ethiopian Telecommunication Authority (ETA) was working on an exclusive basis as an 
operator and regulator until the promulgation of Proclamation No. 49/1996 (latter amended 
by Proclamation No. 281/2002) that established a separate federal telecommunication 
regulatory entity called the Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency (ETA). ETC then has 
taken a responsibility to operate as a public enterprise with the principal duty of installing 
telecom infrastructure facilities and expanding telecommunications services in the country, 
and providing domestic and international telephone, telex, and other communication services 
under the supervision of Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency (ETA) which has the 
objective of promoting the development of "High quality, efficient, reliable and affordable 
telecommunications services". In this respect, it is currently deemed by the regulation that 
ETC is the sole operator of any telecommunications related services, including the provision 
of Internet and public phone in Ethiopia. Both ETA (the regulator) and ETC (the operator) are, 
however, accountable to the Ministry of Transport and Communication (MoTAC) which is 
responsible for policy issues (Taye, 2010). This will be further discussed in chapter four of 
this paper in relation to the institutional arrangement of the sector. 
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
The telecommunications policy reform process began in 1996 with the issuing of 
proclamation 49/1996 (attached in the appendix) that established the regulator, the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Agency (ETA). The Council of Ministers’ Regulation No. 10/1996 that 
established the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation as a public enterprise with 
monopoly over telecommunication services followed this. The public monopoly policy 
environment has changed only slightly since then. According to Hartley and Murphree (2006), 
though ETA (the regulator) acts to make ETC internationally competitive, “such an attempt 
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cannot realize the same benefits as genuine competition”. Moreover, the regulator has not 
been empowered to take sanctions against missed targets by the operator. In other words, the 
regulator (ETA) remained too weak to enforce quality of service targets, set tariffs and carry 
out major regulatory functions. Levi-Faur (2003), also quoted in Hartley et al. (2006), hold 
that the creation of independent regulatory authorities paradoxically reinforces state control 
over the economy. 
According to a paper on Telecommunication in Ethiopia, presented by the company’s chief 
telecommunication development officer in Geneva in March 2010, Ethiopian 
Telecommunication Corporation (ETC) currently has 7.08 million subscribers, of which 1.2 
million fixed, 5.9 million mobile, and 0.060 million Internet. Mobile telephone and internet 
services are being rendered since 1996 and 1997 respectively. Teledensity
ii
 is 1.55% for fixed 
and 7.7% for mobile respectively. The rate of penetration
iii
 of telecom service of the country 
is among the lowest compared with African countries and even among Sub-Saharan African 
countries (Taye, 2010). As mentioned above, although the country has acquired telephone 
technology few years after its invention, its geographical coverage as well as performance is 
not remarkable. 
 
1.4 Purpose of the Study 
The main purpose of this paper is to assess the regulatory framework and industrial policies 
surrounding the telecommunications industry in Ethiopia and their ramifications on the 
progress of telecommunications services in the country. It also assesses whether introducing 
some sort of competition into the sector would improve its efficiency and accessibility. 
Finally, it suggests policy recommendations to improve the efficiency and quality of services 
delivered to customers. 
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1.5 Research Questions  
Some of the questions this study answers include: 
1) What are the industrial policy objectives the government of Ethiopia seeks to achieve 
by running a state-owned telecom enterprise outside the realm of competition? 
2) Would an independent regulatory framework in Ethiopia improve the efficiency and 
accessibility of telecom services in Ethiopia?  
3) How do telecommunications services in Ethiopia measure up compared to selected 
African countries? 
4) Would more competition in the Ethiopian telecom market improve the efficiency and 
delivery of telecom services? 
5) What has been the cumulative impact of these policies on the performance of the 
telecommunication sector in Ethiopia? 
 
1.6 Supporting Arguments and Data 
Data needed for this study are obtained from both primary and secondary sources. Primary 
data are obtained from the company’s (Ethiopia Telecommunication Corporation) 
publications and interview with some of the company officials in person. The main sources of 
secondary data include books, journal articles, and various study reports published by a 
number of independent researchers & international organizations.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
In the past twenty five years or so, a lot of change has been introduced in the 
telecommunications industry. For many countries, introducing competition into the 
telecommunications industry has proved to be much more than allowing additional firms into 
the industry. It requires the transformation of a monopolistic government business into a 
competitive industry, which in turn demands the redefinition of the role the government, 
creation of a proper regulatory regime, a new set of rules governing who can participate in 
what parts of the new business opportunity, rules to set rates and access charges, and so on 
(Nam, 2000). 
 
2.1 Liberalization, Monopoly and Reform 
Souter, quoted in Hartley and Murphree (2006), defines competition as “a market in which 
different suppliers of a service compete to provide customers with the service they require – 
the normal circumstance for most products and services in most countries”. Souter (2005) 
also defines liberalization as “the process of establishing a competitive market out of 
circumstances in which service was provided by a monopoly.” According to Savas, also 
quoted in Hartley et al. (2006), the aforementioned definitions do not include discussion of 
privatization, where ownership of a service provider and its assets are transferred to private 
parties through a variety of mechanisms (Savas, 1999). 
 
Neither competition, and associated liberalization efforts, nor ownership transfers, and 
associated privatization endeavors truly exist as absolute ideals. Rather, they both exist along 
spectrums as elaborated by Hartley and Murphree (2006) in Table 1 below. As the Ethiopian 
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Telecommunications Corporation is public telecom monopoly with virtually no competition, 
this study discusses the possibility with which progression can be achieved from the bottom-
left to top-left square. 
Table 1. Patterns of Liberalization and Privatization Matrix 
 Privatization/ Ownership Spectrum 
      Public                   Fully Private 
 
 
 
 
 
Liberalization/ 
Competition 
Spectrum 
 
 
 
Full 
 
 
 
 
 
None 
Incumbent operator exists, 
with competition from 
second or multiple 
network operators and 
service providers in all 
areas within the sector. 
 
Neo classical market model, 
government does not own a player 
and does not interfere with actors 
entering or exiting the market. 
Government monopoly 
operator exists 
unchallenged, dominates 
all sectors of industry. 
Monopolistic private actor – not 
government owned. 
Source: Hartley and Murphree (2006)  
In the past, telecommunications was viewed as a natural monopoly. Most countries took the 
position that the only way, or at least the best way, to prevent abuse of monopoly power was 
for government to operate the telephone system. The government prevented the entry of 
competitors, allegedly on the ground that they would just wastefully duplicate existing 
facilities or engage in cream skimming, thus inhibiting the government’s ability to provide 
services broadly at reasonable prices – often called universal accessiv (Stiglitz, 1999). 
 
In a similar vein, Wolcott and Çağiltay (2001) hold that that under a philosophy that 
telecommunications is a public service that should be available to all citizens, monopolies are 
held to be the best mechanism for providing universal service, acceptable pricing, and long-
range planning. As a vital national infrastructure for integrating and managing a country, 
particularly in times of crisis, telecommunications has been viewed as a key element of 
national military and economic security, too important to be left in private hands, whether 
domestic or foreign (Urey, 1995; Yildizoglu, 1996). 
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Wolcott and Çağiltay (2001) further elucidate that the classical arguments include the 
“economies of scale and capital investment requirements that make single centralized 
providers the most effective means of delivering a service.” It is believed that natural 
monopolies arise when there is a high fixed cost to providing a good and a negligible 
marginal cost. In competitive markets, price equals the marginal cost – making the price of 
each additional unit negligible. An initial market entrant might be able to set the price and 
recoup the investment expense of high fixed costs (Hartely and Murphree, 2006). 
 
As stated above, a natural monopoly situation usually arises when there are large fixed costs 
and small marginal costs. The existence of a natural monopoly gives rise to the following 
problem: Allowing a natural monopolist to set the monopoly price is undesirable due to the 
Pareto inefficiency, and forcing the natural monopoly to sell at the efficient price (i.e., 
marginal cost based price) is infeasible due to negative profits. The solution to this problem 
was then to let the government operate the service, for example, at price equal to marginal 
cost and to provide a lump-sum subsidy to keep the firm in operation (Kim and Horn, 1999). 
 
Utility or infrastructure monopoly rights are also frequently attached to universal service 
objectives. These are viewed as strategic assets for economic and national security as well 
(Urey 1995 cited in Wolcott and Çağiltay (2001). As a monopoly that can set its price high 
enough to recover costs and turn a profit, it can also provide a source of revenue that 
governments are reluctant to lose, particularly without an obvious candidate for its 
replacement. 
 
However, monopoly service provision is not without its significant weaknesses which some 
scholars and economists argue outweigh the arguments for it. Jerome (2004) also quoted in 
Hartley and Murphree (2006) notes that public utilities are vulnerable to market failures 
where  
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“public monopolies may allow cost to rise above efficient levels or offer 
services of inferior quality; information failures such that consumers are 
unable to assess the quality of the service they are paying for; 
externalities with implications for controlling environmental standards, 
public health and safety; and social concerns since many infrastructure 
services are considered essential to life.” 
 
Wallsten (2004) also agrees and states that “a monopoly provider, whether state-owned or 
private, faces fewer incentives to improve service and lower prices than firms operating in a 
competitive environment do.” Wallesten’s (2004) argument is further reinforced by Joseph 
Stiglitz who holds that companies are likely to dissipate the economies of scale in efficiencies 
when they have no incentives for efficiency and that competition provides the incentives for 
greater investment and thus expanded service, greater efficiency and lower prices (Stiglitz, 
1999).  
 
Additionally, Wallsten (2004) asserts that a telecommunications sector which is not living up 
to its potential can create problems in the arena of economic development and growth. 
Quality and penetration of telecommunications infrastructure can serve as an engine of 
economic growth, making the country more attractive to foreign investment (Wolcott and 
Çağiltay (2001), and lack of these can also perpetuate low incomes (Wallsten (2004). Milne 
(1998), in her discussion of stages of telecommunications network development, notes that 
the hope is that competition will allow “developing economies to condense or even jump a 
stage” of development. Evidence from India, a developing state, has also shown that ICT 
industries can provide a source of economic growth and modernization (Sachs 2005).  
 
In the last 25 years, states began to recognize the benefits of competition in the 
telecommunication sector, and many countries began full liberalization processes. Successes 
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have further encouraged the move to the market model from state-led policies. According to 
Levy and Spiller (1996), “Competition can be a powerful spur to innovation and technical 
efficiency.” Further, they claim “When a country’s major telecommunications company fails 
to develop an adequate communications network, the normative case is strong for opening up 
the sector to competition.” In the local exchange section of the telecommunications sector, it 
has been confirmed that competition was a significant factor in causing the geographical 
penetration of the U.S. telephone market throughout the early stages of the technology’s 
development (Jayakar 1999). 
 
Wallsten (2004) analyzes the efficacy of different telecommunications reform strategies by 
breaking them down into three components – regulatory capacity, competition, and 
privatization. The best results involve increased regulatory capacity paired with competitive 
reforms and privatization of the incumbent. However, he also states that positive results occur 
when increased regulator capacity is included with increased competition, and that 
competition itself is the most significant factor affecting service. 
 
When it comes to Ethiopia, privatization is generally the most unappealing option to 
Ethiopian governmental stakeholders. The lack of political will for this prong of reform could 
stem from the lesson of the failed 2002-2003 effort, from the loss of control that privatization 
would necessitate, or from other less distinct causes. However, it can be concurred with 
Wallsten’s (2004) assessment that even without privatization, significant gains could be 
realized in the Internet service provision sector. According to Wallsten (2004), in the 
telecommunication sector, “competition is associated with increased mainline penetration, 
payphones, connection capacity and lower prices for local calls. Privatization by itself 
meanwhile is associated with few benefits.” 
 
Ethiopian leadership intends to liberalize downstream services without having to first divest 
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itself of ownership. Accordingly, the Ethiopian government could continue to operate the 
ETC and benefit from the stimulus of other entrants into the value-added market. They would 
not have to give up control of the network, backbone or connection to the international 
gateway to other market entrants. In the partial liberalization framework, these would remain 
the exclusive domain of the ETC. Research has thus shown both why governments opt for 
monopolies, and why they choose to reform them. 
 
2.2 Telecommunications Regulation 
Souter and Girardet (2000), in a paper
v
 presented for the Commonwealth Telecommunication 
Organization, have classified the bases for regulation in telecoms into three forms which are 
presented as follows: 
 
2.2.1 Technical Standards Regulation. To be worthwhile, telecoms networks 
must interconnect, and telephone receivers and other customer equipment must 
interoperate with them. Throughout the century the more that people have used 
telephones, the more the International Telecommunication Union and other 
agencies have developed standards to facilitate this – the equivalent of standard 
electrical sockets or railway gauges. The development of such standards is 
obviously important in access and market development, though increasingly today 
responsibility for it is being taken by the industry itself. 
 
2.2.2 Public Policy or Public Interest Regulation. Refers to the introduction of 
rules by governments for reasons of public interest where it is felt that outcomes 
are too important to allow the free play of market forces, or where markets are 
thought unable to function effectively (market failure). In other sectors, this public 
interest regulation includes (for example) restriction of access to markets in 
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alcohol or firearms. In telecoms, its most important aspect has been the use of 
various mechanisms, including cross-subsidies, to make access more financially 
viable for the majority of citizens, particularly where it is believed the market will 
fail to provide competing service offerings. This is known as universal access or 
universal service policy, and is of particular importance in LDCs today. 
 
2.2.3 Economic Regulation. This is effectively the implementation in telecoms of 
the accepted principles of competition law. It is this aspect of competition that has 
been commonly understood as ‘telecommunications regulation’ in recent years. It 
amounts to a process of policing the introduction of competition by imposing 
constraints on the incumbent operator and offering incentives to market entrants 
that will facilitate market expansion and better customer service; and subsequently 
managing the market that develops towards ‘normal’ market conditions. It differs 
from the standard application of competition law principally because its starting 
point – monopoly – necessitates asymmetric application of competition principles 
in order to secure the establishment of a competitive market; though some 
regulators in more established markets, like Britain’s OFTEL, are now 
consciously moving towards the application of normal competition law. 
 
2.3 The Role of Regulation 
Souter and Girardet (2000) have also identified what specifically telecommunications 
regulators do, in terms firstly of economic regulation, and secondly of the most important 
dimension of public policy regulation, universal access. 
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2.3.1 Economic Regulation. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
established basic standard requirements for economic regulation in a Reference 
Paper attached to its Agreement on Telecommunications Services. The objective of 
this Agreement is to open markets, to promote competition, and to ensure fairness 
between operators.  
 
The key provisions of the Reference Paper are that: 
1. the government should establish a regulatory body independent of operating 
companies; 
2. the regulatory body should: 
 establish safeguards to prevent anti-competitive behavior; 
 make licensing criteria publicly available; 
 provide for interconnection between competing operators; 
 apply universal service obligations in a neutral and transparent way; 
 allocate scarce resources fairly between operators. 
 
This gives a good introduction to what most concerns economic regulators in this sector, 
including those in LDCs. The following summarize the key issues. 
 
2.3.2 Licensing. The regulator will generally be responsible for developing the 
terms on which telecoms licenses are offered and awarded; and for enforcing 
license conditions once they are in place. In practice, most developing countries 
are choosing to issue a limited number of licenses, with liberalization based 
around, perhaps, two ‘fixed network’ operators, and a similar number for the 
mobile sector. Universal access requirements will normally be included in these 
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licenses, as may constraints on the service offerings that can be provided by a 
particular operator. 
 
2.3.3 Allocation of Scarce Resources. Two key scarce resources exist in telecoms 
– radio spectrum (required by both fixed and mobile operators) and numbers. The 
regulator should seek to ensure that no competitor derives a unique advantage 
from its position in respect of either. 
 
2.3.4 Interconnection. All networks in competitive markets must interconnect so 
that all customers of all networks can communicate with one other. This is an 
issue both of technical interoperability
vi
 and of commercial practice. The 
regulator’s key concern will be to establish principles which ensure that no 
operator delays or inhibits interconnection to disadvantage a competitor, and to 
establish a pricing framework within interconnection agreements that gives 
competitors access to the incumbent operator’s customers on the same terms as 
that incumbent operator’s own retail service provider business. Interconnection 
charges are typically over 50% of market entrants’ costs, making this crucial to 
their business viability. Unfortunately, the information on real costs within the 
established network that is essential here is often very poor. 
 
2.3.5 Implementation of Competition Law. The regulator will enforce standard 
competition law principles within the sector, aiming in particular to prevent abuse 
of dominance and anti-competitive behavior such as predatory pricing and undue 
preference by the incumbent (former monopoly) operator. Opening infrastructure 
use to service providers other than the infrastructure owner has proved particularly 
important in encouraging service competition. 
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2.3.6 Pricing. Monopoly telecom tariff structures typically involve extensive 
cross-subsidies. In particular, line rental and local call usage charges are often 
below cost, while high margins are maintained on long-distance and, particularly, 
international calls. This is unsustainable in a competitive market – as market 
entrants will focus solely on high-margin market segments – and so price 
rebalancing is required. This needs to be carefully managed, however, if price 
rises for basic services are not to deter new customers. In addition, the regulator 
will probably seek to manage the tariffs of the incumbent operator through a 
general price control regime, such an UK-style price caps or individual rate 
regulation. 
 
2.3.7 Quality of Service. The regulator may also impose standards for the quality 
of services offered to consumers, including standards for (e.g.) billing accuracy as 
well as for technical network performance. 
 
These primary regulatory responsibilities are, therefore, to do with the effective development 
of a competitive market. The degree to which these regulatory responsibilities affect access to 
information and communication has to do with the effectiveness of competition in promoting 
access, and partly with the effectiveness of regulation in promoting competition. 
 
2.4 Universal Access 
The term universal access has been frequently used to refer to a situation in which 100 per 
cent population of a given country has access to a given service (in this case 
telecommunication services). In the context of this paper, the given service is understood to 
be a public payphone or telecenter on a shared community basis. One of the most important 
issues in the area of telecommunications that regulators are pressed to address is achieving 
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universal access to telecommunications services for their citizens. The importance of 
universal access to telecommunications services cannot be understated (Manner, 2003). As 
the International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) 2003 World Summit on Information 
Society (“WSIS”) recognized, there is a global need “to build a people centered inclusive and 
development oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and 
share information and knowledge” and that “connectivity is a central enabling agent in 
building the Information Society” (Manner, 2003). According to Manner (2003), the goal of 
universal access is achieved in a country when telecommunications services are made 
available to all citizens, without regard to geography, on an affordable basis. 
Accordingly, to successfully achieve universal access, a country must enable a 
telecommunications regime that meets the components of affordability, availability, and 
accessibility (Manner, 2003). These components can be more specifically defined as follows: 
i) Affordability: Communications services should be affordable to all citizens 
without any cost variations based on location, terrain, climate and/or rural/urban 
distinctions. 
ii) Availability: The level of communications services provided should be the same 
regardless where one lives. 
iii) Accessibility: Mental and physical ability should not affect access to 
communications services. 
 
In crafting a successful universal access policy, it is essential that countries take each of these 
components into account. If even a single component is omitted, the universal access policy 
will ultimately exclude significant segments of the population. According to the World 
Telecommunication Report (1998), for developing countries, basing telecommunications 
development around policies of universal service is problematic. This is because universal 
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service is not a single concept but, rather, a composite, comprising nationwide availability, 
non-discriminatory access and widespread affordability which have tended to be achieved in 
stages. Pursuing all three simultaneously involves making hard choices: the deployment of a 
nationwide telecommunication network is a costly undertaking, but regulating for affordable 
prices may reduce revenues. 
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III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
According to Stiglitz (1999), the new telecom regulators being introduced in developing 
countries are primarily concerned with the introduction and management of competition in a 
sector which has historically been built around public sector monopolies and that the way in 
which competition is introduced and managed can have an important impact in encouraging 
or discouraging the development of access in rural/unserved areas. Souter and Girardet, 2000) 
also hold that Telecommunications regulation as a growth industry forms an essential part of 
a process of restructuring which is taking place in almost every national telecommunications 
sector worldwide (Souter and Girardet, 2000). In the case of Ethiopia, the regulator (ETA) 
has given license to only one operator (ETC) which effectively introduced a public telecom 
monopoly. Moreover, because the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) is 
viewed as a tool to execute the policies determined by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communication and not as a firm whose objective is to seek profits, it follows that the 
regulator, Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency (ETA), has not been an independent 
regulatory body. 
 
Moreover, to improve Internet usage in Ethiopia from its existing level, the regulatory body, 
Ethiopian Telecommunications (ETA) should allow competing businesses to operate as ISP 
(Internet Service Providers) along with the incumbent operator, the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation (ETC). ETC’s monopoly over all telecommunication 
services has made it less efficient and effective as its work force increases and mandate 
expands.  The participation of the private sector would not only improve competition but also 
relieve the government from the investment burden in telecommunications. Moreover, 
competition provides the incentives for greater investment and thus expanded service, greater 
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efficiency, and lower prices. Hence, 
Hypothesis 1: An independent regulatory framework would improve the performance of the 
sector in Ethiopia. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Introducing competition into the Ethiopian telecom market would enhance the 
existing level of connectivity in the country. 
 
3.1 Hypotheses Testing and Discussion 
This chapter deals with discussion and testing of the hypotheses provided in chapter three of 
this paper. The hypothesis testing will be conducted in light of the review of literature on 
telecommunications presented in chapter two and a discussion of the telecommunication 
policies and performance level in Ethiopia presented in this chapter. 
 
First of all, however, it is worth dealing with what the industrial policy objectives are the 
Ethiopian government seeks to achieve by running a public telecom monopoly and then 
discuss their soundness as policy objectives to serve as justification for doing so. Basically, 
the three main industrial policy objectives justifying the government’s grip on the telecom 
market are: achieving universal access, ensuring national security, and poverty alleviation. 
 
3.2 Industrial Policy Objectives 
3.2.1 Universal Access 
Much of the ETC’s current strategy, as directed by the government, is informed 
by traditional universal service objectives – i.e. to roll out voice services to every 
warada (district) and ultimately to the smallest administrative unit, the kebele 
(farmer’s association) (ITU, 2002). Basic voice services are seen as the primary 
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concern to be addressed, rather than to use scarce resources for more limited 
demand for advanced services. This is also seen as a reason for ensuring that ETC 
retains a monopoly in all services so that the funds for rolling out services in rural 
areas are not siphoned off by foreign, cream-skimming competitors focusing on 
the more lucrative urban areas. 
 
The incumbent argues that telecommunications infrastructure is a public good and 
government is best placed to promote universal access. The government also feels 
that it has the obligation to deploy communication networks to rural areas as per 
its decentralization program, and the incumbent operator should do this. 
 
The government holds that if private investors are allowed to enter the telecom 
market, they would shun capital investments in rural areas. The government is 
apprehensive that the profit motives of multinational companies who are 
interested in the cream of telecom market would lead to the marginalization of the 
rural poor. 
 
While too many people are convinced that liberalization is the only way out, the 
government has been reluctant to open up the sector holding that “liberalization 
will not result in positive net changes to poor people due to the profit motives of 
the multinational companies that are interested in the cream telecom market”. 
According to the government, privatization would only lead to the further 
marginalization of the rural poor by the profit-seeking private companies. Hence, 
it looks determined to keep the status quo in telecoms for a long time to come. 
 
According to Adam (2007), although there is merit in some of the arguments, 
particularly in government’s role in rolling out broadband infrastructure that 
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underpin Ethiopia’s future economic growth, clinging to inefficient services will 
not serve the development purpose. Adam (2007) continues to contend that the 
argument that liberalization will not result in positive net changes to poor people 
is invalid since private investment versus subsidy auction (where investors bid for 
lower subsidy to provide services in rural areas) has now become particularly 
effective in developing countries like Chile and Uganda. Moreover, studies by 
RIA! show that poor people often pay more than the wealthier section of the 
society, in terms of time and fees, to make phone calls and therefore rural access 
is profitable for small and large players alike. 
3.2.2 National Security 
Another justification for maintaining the telecom monopoly grip, although not as 
publicly told as ‘universal access’, is that the government views 
telecommunications as strategic assets of the economy and national security. It is 
true that Ethiopia faces security threats from such neighboring countries as 
Eritrea and Somalia. Following Eritrea’s (part of Ethiopia till 1995) invasion of 
some Ethiopian territories, Ethiopia requested a return to the status quo ante (the 
way things were before) before any negotiation could take place which didn’t get 
acceptance from Eritrea’s side. Ethiopia then fought a bloody war (1998-2000) 
and regained its territories although both countries spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars and suffered tens of thousands of casualties as a direct consequence of the 
conflict. Ethiopia also fought another war with Somali in 2006 following the 
declaration of Jihad against it by the Islamic Court Union (ICU) of Somalia. 
 
The researcher has browsed the Internet to see if history could provide us with an 
example of a country that has monopolized or nationalized its telecom industry 
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for national security reasons. Indeed, in 1918, in the midst of World War I, the US 
federal government nationalized the entire telecommunications industry for a 
similar reason. According to Thierer
vii
 (1994), this war provided the US 
government with a convenient excuse to forcefully gain control over 
communications and forever change the structure of the telephone industry. 
 
When it comes to Ethiopia, the question that should be raised at this particular 
juncture is whether these threats are credible enough to serve as valid ground for 
not liberalizing the sector. In the researcher’s view, given the fact that Ethiopia’s 
‘arch foe enemies’ (Eritrea and Somalia) are weak and fragile nations, Ethiopia’s 
military might in the horn region, and that Ethiopia is not, after all, the only 
nation in the world to face such security threats, the argument by the Ethiopian 
government doesn’t seem to hold water. 
3.2.3 Poverty Reduction 
The government of Ethiopia has been aggressively moving and implementing 
development strategies aimed at reducing the poverty prevailing in the country. In 
this line, telecommunication plays a key role in facilitating poverty reduction and 
development strategy being implemented by the government. To this end, the 
government has designed strategies to expand telecommunication national 
network infrastructure, and other infrastructures (roads and power) and, thereby, 
increase the socio-economic development of the country in general and telecom 
penetration rate in particular. 
 
Apart from the aforementioned reasons for maintaining a monopoly grip on 
telecommunications, an obvious reason why the government would like to hold 
on to the state-owned enterprise is its interest in recouping the massive 
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investment in recent years. The ETC has spent large amounts of capital to 
develop its monopoly network. Significant investment of time, financial and other 
resources encourages risk-aversion and promotes sustaining the status quo. This 
was not counterbalanced by the assessment of the potential positive impact that 
private investment might have on cost of business, economic growth or potential 
fiscal revenues through taxation (Adam, 2007). 
 
3.3 Institutional Arrangement, Agents and Influence on the Ethiopian 
Telecommunication Services 
As is well known, one of the most important developments in the area of communications 
industry was the separation of telecom policy, regulation and operation. This approach is 
believed to have improved the sector’s performance, and hence, globally the number of 
independent regulators increased from 13 in 1990 to 112 in 2001 (Taye, 2010). In Ethiopia, 
though some officials from the company believe the government has taken basic steps in 
separating the three basic functions stated above (industrial policies, regulation, and 
operation), the reality is rather different. This can be clearly seen in Article 57 of the Council 
of Ministers’ Regulation on Telecommunications Services in 1999 (Regulation No. 47/1999 
also attached in the appendix) which reads: 
 
     57. Power to Issue Directives 
 “Without prejudice to the powers given to the Agency by 
these regulations, the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications shall have the power to issue directives 
necessary for the proper implementation of these 
Regulations.”  
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According to Adam (2007), this regulation, in effect, gives the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications the power to issue directives without recourse to the regulator. Without 
distinction on whether the directives are of policy or operational nature, the Ministry can 
direct the sector without involving ETA if it deems necessary. Effectively, ETA acts as a 
department within the ministry. This can be compared with the 1980s telecom industry in 
Korea in which the Ministry of Communications (MOC) tied the Korea Telecom (KT) as a 
tool to execute its policies and not as a firm whose objective was to seek profits, essentially 
making KT a business unit rather than a firm (Nam, 2000). 
 
There has been lack of regulatory authority with adequate powers to regulate the sector. 
Hence, in much the same way as the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) of 
Korea did in the 1990s, the Ministry of Transport and Communication in Ethiopia has, in 
effect, combined the roles regulation and promotion of industrial policies for the 
telecommunications industry in Ethiopia. All these testify to the fact that the incumbent 
telecom operator has been run as instrument of industrial policy rather than a profit-seeking 
firm. The regulator’s role has only been nominal, largely confined to collecting license fees in 
accordance with the rate approved by the Ministry of Trade and Communication (Article 6:11 
Council of Ministers Regulations No. 49/1996). 
 
However, unlike the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) of Korea which 
used to issue licenses to service providers in the 1990s, Article 6(5) of the Council of 
Ministers Regulations No. 49/1996) has empowered the regulator (ETA), at least in law, to 
license telecommunication service operator/s though so far it has issued a license to the 
incumbent operator only – The Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC). 
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Figure 2. Institutional Arrangements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adam (2007) 
 
As can be seen in the figure above, the communication sector governance framework and 
institutional arrangement comprises a number of players that have influence on the regulatory 
environment. These include the Prime Minister, who makes ultimate decisions on policy and 
regulatory matters, and the Council of Ministers who approve communications regulations 
and set the budget of the Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency. The Ministry of Transport 
and Communications defines the policy framework, directs the regulator and oversees the 
activities of the incumbent operator. The ministry appoints the general manager of the ETA 
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of ETC. 
 
Prime Minister 
Council of 
Ministers 
Ministry of Capacity 
Building 
Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communication 
Ministry of 
Information 
ETC Board 
ETC 
GSTIT 
EBA ETA EICTDA 
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Figure 3. Highlight of the Major Influence Channels  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 Source: Hartley and Murphree (2006) 
 
According to Adam (2007), the regulator (ETA) has no board of directors or councillors; nor 
does it have sufficient human resources to deal with complex regulatory challenges such as 
licensing, frequency assignment and monitoring, setting and enforcing tariffs, dispute 
resolution, maintaining quality of service and promoting universal access. It has been unable 
to attract and retain skilled employees with legal, regulatory, management and technical skills, 
partly due to low public sector remuneration. In effect, there is a gross absence of those skills 
in the country. 
1. Ministry →ETC: The Ministry receives targets, goals and plan objectives 
from the Council of Ministers and relays these to the ETC. The ETC, as 
an operator, has little formal influence on the Ministry. The ETC could 
lose its monopoly license if it failed to meet targets set by the Ministry.  
 
2. Ministry → ETA: The Ministry controls the appointment of the Director 
of the ETA and must approve its annual report. The Ministry sends 
general policy initiative frameworks to the ETA for drafting.  
 
3. Council of Ministers →ETA: The Council of Ministers controls the 
ETA’s budget. ETA budgets must be approved by the Council who also 
reviews the annual ETA performance.  
 
4. ETA →ETC: The ETA regulates the ETC and has the right to adjudicate 
in disputes between the ETC and customers. The ETA uses its licensing 
procedure to hold the ETC responsible to international standards of 
efficiency and service quality. The Ethiopian government attempts to use 
effective regulation and service targets as a surrogate for competition. 
The ETA is also responsible for licensing new VaSPs and ensuring fair 
contracts are signed between the ETC and individual VaSPs.  
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The ICT sector falls within the Ministry of Capacity Building that defines the national ICT 
strategy and promotes ICT in public services. The Ministry hosts the Ethiopian ICT 
Development Agency (EICTDA) that is responsible for the development and implementation 
of the national ICT Policy. The ICT Development Agency works closely with the regulator 
but does not always take into account telecommunications sector issues in its policy 
provisions. A separate ministry, the Ministry of Information, deals with the broadcasting 
sector and oversees the activities of the Ethiopian Broadcasting Agency (EBA). 
 
According to Fink and et al (2003), in a number of countries, ‘autonomous’ regulators have 
been created but are rarely fully independent. He further argues that while the existence of a 
separate regulatory agency indicates that a government is willing to commit to pro-
competitive regulatory principles, a regulator can be ineffective if key regulatory 
responsibilities (e.g., interconnection) fall outside its mandate. Hence, it can be argued that an 
independent regulatory framework would contribute to improved telecommunication services 
in Ethiopia. 
 
Hypothesis 1: An independent regulatory framework would improve the performance of the 
sector in Ethiopia. 
 
Table 2. Independent Regulatory Framework versus Improved Telecommunications 
Performance.  
 
Author Year Research Issue 
Fink and et al. 2003 An assessment of telecommunications reform 
in developing countries.  
Nam 2000 Competition Policies for the 
Telecommunications Industry in Korea  
Hartley and Murphree 2006 Influences on the Partial Liberalization of 
Internet Service Provision in Ethiopia 
Adam 2007 Ethiopia Telecommunications Sector 
Performance Review a supply side analysis 
of policy outcomes 
Stiglitz 1999 Promoting Competition in 
Telecommunications 
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3.4 Experiences from African Countries and Possibilities of Liberalizing the Sector 
As has been shown in table 3 below, as a monopoly enterprise, the state-owned Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) and the regulator (ETA) have exclusive control over 
telecommunication services in the country. And the Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency 
(ETA) is not an independent regulatory agency. 
 
Table 3. Regulatory and Policy Highlights 
Telecommunication Services 
Fixed line and mobile services 
 
 
 
Internet services 
 
 
 
Downstream value added services such as call 
center, cyber café and messaging services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VSAT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VoIP 
 
Telecommunications Equipment 
 
Policy 
ETC is the sole provider of fixed and 
mobile services. The services are bundled 
together. 
 
ETC is the sole provider of Internet 
service; Virtual ISPs are allowed to buy 
bandwidth and resell Internet 
 
Downstream value added services such as 
call centers, pay phones and messaging 
services are allowed for competition. 
However, there are a few legally 
registered phone shops; Cyber café 
services allowed. 
Call back or use of modern technology to 
divert international traffic is not allowed 
and is punishable by fines and 
imprisonment. 
 
Individuals and enterprises are not 
allowed to own VSATs. International 
organizations are allowed to own VSAT 
with payment of traffic compensation or 
“landing right” fees on case by case basis. 
The regulator is being empowered to 
license VSATs.  
 
VoIP is not allowed. 
 
Sale of mobile and telephone handsets is 
allowed 
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As a result there has not been any opportunity even for the entrance of other Internet Service 
Providers in Ethiopia while the picture looks different in other African countries. With regard 
to the number of ISPs and Internet connectivity in some selected African countries, the 
following table shows that “in countries where there is no competition in the ISP space, 
Internet penetration is dismal.” According to Kassegne et al. (2001), the only guarantee for a 
growing and sustainable Internet penetration is the presence of competition in the ISP space. 
 
Table 4. Summary of Number of ISPs and Internet Connectivity in Selected African Countries 
Country 
Number of Licensed 
ISPs 
Estimated Number 
of Dial-up Internet 
Account Holders 
Average 
Cost of 
Connectivity 
1. South Africa 120 
350,000 (estimated 2 
million users)  
$12/month 
2. Kenya 50 
15,000 + 30,000 (e-
Touch Service) 
- 
3. Ghana 40 [only 8 operational] 
15,000 (estimated 0.5 
million with cyber café 
access) 
$35/month 
4. Nigeria 40 
50,000 (estimated 
100,000 users)  
- 
5. Egypt 40 
50,000 (estimated 
250,000 users)  
$25/month 
6. Zimbabwe 28 25,000 $15/month 
7. Mali 13 5000 $30/month 
8. Mozambique 10 15,000 - 
9. Senegal 9 15,000 $40/month 
10. Botswana 6 30,000 $15/month 
11. Namibia 6 15,000 - 
12. Uganda 5 10,000 - 
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13. Somalia 3 1500 $15/hour 
14. Zambia 3 7500 $20/month 
15. Sudan 3 3500 $25/month 
16. Ethiopia 1 2500 $20/month 
Source: Kassegne et al (2001) 
 
As can be seen in the above table, it can easily be seen that the more ISPs a country has the 
more the number of dial up account holders and the lower the average cost of connectivity. 
This is especially true for South African with 120 licensed ISPs dial up account holders (2 
million users) that have driven the average cost of connectivity down to $12/month. In 
contrast, Ethiopia has done very poorly under a single ISP, in which the number of dial up 
account holders was only 2500 – the average of cost of connectivity standing at almost twice 
that of South Africa. In cases like South Africa, it is the competition among the ISPs that had 
created the incentive for greater efficiency and lower average cost of connectivity. What 
makes it really surprising is that even Somalia often identified as a ‘failed state’ has 3 
providers with 1500 dial up Internet account holders driving the average cost of connectivity 
down to $12/hour. 
 
According to Kassegne et al (2001), if ISP industry could thrive in an environment as difficult 
and challenging as in Somalia - almost in the absence of a government - then why is it that 
Ethiopia, a country with one of the largest and most experienced telecom technical and 
management labor force is wasting such an opportunity? ETA with the mission of licensing 
internet service providers (ISPs), monitoring and spectrum allocation, tariff approval, 
customer protection, adjudication of disputes, and assistance in drafting policy, has offered 
license to only the state-owned telecom operator (ETC). Experiences from the 
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aforementioned country examples show that more ISPs would lower costs and improve the 
existing connectivity in Ethiopia. 
 
Table 5. Communications Market Gap between Ethiopia and Neighboring Countries 
 Ethiopia Kenya Sudan 
Mobile (2008)  3% 39% 30% 
Internet Users (2009)  360,000  3,360,000  3,800,000 
Penetration 
(2008) 
0.0005% 0.01% 0.02% 
Driver of Universal 
Access  
Incumbent CCK NTC 
Regulator Partially 
independent 
Fully independent Partially 
independent 
Source: Ethiopia ICT Sector Performance Review, Lishan Adam (2010) 
 
According to the table above, the number of Internet users in Ethiopia (with 80 million 
population) in 2009 stood only at 360,000 while the number of Internet users in Sudan and 
Kenya was 3,360,000 (pop. 44 mil.) and 3,800,000 (pop. 40 mil) respectively. The number of 
mobile users in Ethiopia in the same year was only 3 per cent of the total population while in 
Sudan and Kenya the percentage of mobile users was 39 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. 
The Sudan has 3 Internet Providers while Kenya has more than 50 ISPs.  
 
According to Kassegn and et al (2001), the experience of neighboring African countries 
shows that governments fare better when they introduce an environment for competition and 
innovation on a gradual basis. In Kenya for example, the combined government tax revenue 
from the operators is close to $1 billion. Sudatel is one of the most competitive operators in 
the African market. Nothing prevents Ethiopia from making similar progress over the next 
decade, if careful policy choices are made in the communication sector. Although the 
government recognizes its limitations in the provision of telecom services, it continued to 
keep on holding its monopoly status (Kassegne and et al (2001). 
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H2: Introducing competition into the Ethiopian telecom market would enhance the existing 
level of connectivity in the country. 
 
Table 6. Competition versus Improved Telecommunication Services in Ethiopia 
Author Year Research Issue 
Kassegne and et al 2001 Responding to a New Challenge: The Case of 
Telecom Policy in Ethiopia 
Adam 2007 Ethiopia Telecommunications Sector 
Performance Review a supply side analysis 
of policy outcomes 
Stiglitz 1999 Promoting Competition in 
Telecommunications 
Wallsten 2003 Of Carts and Horse: Regulation and 
Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms 
Milne 1998 Stages of Universal Service Policy. 
Telecommunications Policy 
 
Hence, the researcher accepts the hypothesis that opening up and introducing more 
competition into the Ethiopian telecom market would enhance the existing level of 
connectivity in the country. 
 
3.5 The Combined Impact of these Policies 
The telecommunications industry is one of the fastest-growing sectors in most countries. 
Currently its service revenue alone, equipment sales not included, accounts for approximately 
two to three percent of GDP in most countries (Li and et al, 2001). The sector is believed to 
offer substantial positive externalities to other industries by, among other things, reducing 
transaction costs for businesses. Moreover, Roller and Waveman (2001), quoted in Li and et 
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al. (2001), have found a positive linkage between a country’s telecommunications 
infrastructure and its economic growth. 
 
In Ethiopia, however, the contribution of Telecommunications to GDP has been declining in 
recent years. As can shown in the figure below, telecommunications revenue as a percentage 
of GDP rose from 1.6 in 2002 to 2.3 in 2005 but fell to 1.35 in 2009. 
 
Table 7. Contribution of Telecommunication Sector to the GDP 
 2002 2003 3004 2005 2006 2007 2008 200
9 
GDP at market 
price (billions) 
7.79  8.17  10.1  12.3  15.2  19.4  26.5  34 
Telecommunication 
Revenue in US 
$ billion 
.104  .123  .144  .211  .280  .367  .345  .453 
Telecommunication 
Revenue as %age of 
GDP 
in market price 
1.6  1.8  1.75  2.3  2.0  2.0  1.4  1.35 
Source: Adam (2009/2010) 
 
Adam (2009/2010) attributes the decline of the revenue as a percentage of GDP partly to the 
drop in the value of the Ethiopian Birr. The inability of the incumbent (ETC) to improve the 
quality of service and develop innovative products that boost its Average Revenue Per User 
(ARPU) is mostly to blame for the plummeting revenue as percentage of GDP (Adam, 2007).  
 
One of the reasons for the poor contribution of telecommunications to the Ethiopian economy 
is the monopolistic structure of the industry. This view is also supported by The Investment 
Climate Assessment Report (2004) which holds that considerable lack of access to and 
quality of services results from a monopolistic structure; restrictive legal environment 
prohibiting involvement of the private sector, coupled with insufficient public resources for 
infrastructure development; and weak institutional and human capacity for implementation. 
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The monopolistic structure of the telecommunications sector in Ethiopia has resulted in 
limited access to and poor quality of services in these sectors. 
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IV. FINDINGS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Based on the policy and regulatory problems discussed in the preceding chapters, the 
following policy recommendations have been suggested to rectify the problems observed: 
 As it has been discussed above, the three functions that need to be separated to 
improve the progress of any telecom industry have not been separated. Hence, the 
Ethiopian government needs to separate the policy, regulatory, and operational 
functions to establish a level playing field. Moreover, it has to enhance the capacity 
to regulate and manage within the Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency (ETA), 
with appropriate changes to the legislation to ensure that it is an independent agency 
with significant capacity to establish and enforce a predictable and consistent 
regulatory framework, including licensing. This can be done, for instance, by 
appointing an independent board. This can go to a great length in enhancing the 
credibility of the regulator in the eyes of both consumers and potential competitors. 
 
 It has been that the telecom sector in Ethiopia has been a public monopoly with no 
prospects of liberalization in the near future. Countries that have more than one 
internet service providers (ISPs), hence the resulting intense competition, have 
created better access to telecommunication services for their citizens. It is in the 
interest of the general public for Ethiopian government to liberalize the sector both to 
the domestic and foreign competition and create a more competitive industry. This 
would allow the regulator to gain valuable regulatory role later when the sector is 
opened for competitors. This can be done, for instance, by unbundling the 
telecommunications services and introduce competition in those particular services 
suitable for and can be operated by the private sector. The increased participation of 
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the private sector over time will not only enhance competition but also relieve the 
government of the much needed investment fund. 
 
 The telecommunications industry has been characterized by discouraging human 
resource situation; hence, a lot has to be done in training, employing and maintaining 
well-qualified staff within the Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency (ETA). This, 
however, is a futile attempt without a governance framework that allows the sector to 
thrive through gradual introduction of competition and a flexible regulatory structure 
to enable it. 
 
 Despite the fact that the incumbent government has been making massive investment 
on telecom infrastructure especially on rolling out broadband infrastructure, the 
overall utilization of the broadband network is too low. Hence, beyond expanding the 
existing infrastructure, the Ethiopian government should work on improving the 
utilization of the existing infrastructure. 
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i
 The Ethiopia Macroeconomic Handbook 2010.  
http://www.accesscapitalsc.com/downloads/The-Ethiopia-Macroeconomic-Handbook-
2010.pdf 
ii
 Refers to the number of landline telephones in use for every 100 individuals living within   
 an area (Computer Dictionary Definition). 
http://computer.yourdictionary.com/teledensity 
iii
 Refers to the extent to which access to a certain service has been achieved.  
 http://www.scribd.com/doc/6491215/New-Models-for-Universal-Access-Regulatel 
iv
 A situation in which 100 per cent population of a given country has access to a given 
service. In the context of this paper, the given service is understood to be a public payphone 
or telecenter on a shared community basis.  
 http://www.scribd.com/doc/6491215/New-Models-for-Universal-Access-Regulatel 
v
 Imfundo Project Knowledge Bank Question 13: Regulatory Frameworks; For 
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vi
 Is the ability of a system or a product to work with other systems or products without 
special effort on the part of the customer   
http://searchsoa.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci212372,00.html 
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 Thierer Adam. “Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development of the Bell 
System Monopoly,” The CATO Journal: Volume 14 Number 2, Fall 1994. 
 http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cjv14n2-6.html 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
PROCLAMATION NO. 49/1996 
A Proclamation to Provide for the Regulation of Telecommunications 
WHEREAS, telecommunication service performs an essential role in the Country’s economic 
and social development; 
WHEREAS, the establishment of a separate regulatory organ other than the operator and the 
prescription of regulatory provisions are found necessary to make the telecommunication 
service more efficient and reliable; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with Article 55(1) of the Constitution of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, it is hereby Proclaimed as follows: 
 
PART ONE 
GENERAL 
1. Short Title 
This Proclamation may be cited as the “Telecommunication Proclamation No. 49/1996″. 
2. Definitions 
1) In this Proclamation, unless the context requires otherwise: 
“telecommunication” means the emission, transmission or reception, through the 
agency of electricity or electromagnetism, of any sounds, signs, signals, writing, 
images or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic 
systems whether or not such signs, signals, writing, images, sounds or intelligence 
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have been subjected to rearrangement, computation or other processes by any means 
in the course of their transmission, emission or reception; 
2) “telecommunication line” means any wire, cable, tower, mast, antenna, pole or any 
other structure or equipment used or intended to be used in connection with a 
telecommunication system; 
3) “basic telecommunication service” means telephone, telegram or telex service; 
4) “telecommunication equipment” includes any appliance, apparatus or accessory used 
or intended to be used for telecommunication services; 
5) “TVRO” means an apparatus used only for the reception of satellite television 
broadcasts; 
6) “call-back service” means the use of dial tone of a foreign telecommunication 
operator for international connections without the knowledge of the domestic 
telecommunication operator; 
7) “Ministry” and “Minister” means the Ministry and Minister of Transport and 
communication, respectively: 
8) “person” means a natural or a juridical person. 
 
PART TWO 
THE TELECOMMUNICATION AGENCY 
3. Establishment 
1) The Ethiopian Telecommunication Agency (hereinafter “the Agency”) is hereby 
established as an autonomous federal agency having its own legal personality. 
2) The Agency shall be accountable to the Ministry. 
4. Head Office 
The Agency shall have its head office in Addis Ababa and may have branch offices elsewhere 
as may be necessary. 
5. Objectives 
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The objectives of the Agency shall be to promote the development of high quality, efficient, 
reliable and affordable telecommunication services. 
6. Powers and Duties 
The Agency shall have the following powers and duties: 
1) to ensure that telecommunication services are operated in a manner that will best 
serve and contribute to the Country’s economic and social development; 
2) to specify technical standards and procedures for the provision of telecommunication 
services; 
3) to ensure that telecommunication services conform to the specified standards of 
quality; 
4)  to regulate tariffs relating to basic telecommunication services; 
5) to license and supervise operators of telecommunication services; 
6) to regulate types of telecommunication equipment which may be connected to a 
telecommunication system; 
7) to authorize and supervise the use of frequencies allotted to Ethiopia; 
8) where authorized by the Minister, subject to the appropriate laws and government 
directives, to represent the Government in international conferences and international 
organizations concerned with telecommunications; and to follow up the 
implementation of treaties dealing with telecommunications to which Ethiopia is a 
party. 
9) to collaborate with educational institutions in order to promote technical education in 
the fields of telecommunications; 
10) to collect licence fees in accordance with the rate approved by the Ministry; 
11) to own property, to enter into contracts and to sue and be sued in its own name; 
12) to perform such other related activities as may be necessary for the attainment of its 
objectives. 
7. Management of the Agency 
1) The Agency shall have a General Manager, to be appointed by the Government upon 
the recommendation of the Minister, and the necessary staff; 
2) The General Manger shall be the chief executive officer of the Agency and shall, 
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subject to the general directives of the Minister, direct and administer the activities of 
the Agency; 
3) Without limiting the generality of sub-Article (2) of this Article, the General Manager 
shall: 
(a) exercise the powers and duties of the Agency specified under Article 6 of this 
Proclamation; 
(b) employ and administer the employees of the Agency in accordance with 
directives approved by the Government following the basic principles of the federal 
civil service laws; 
(c) prepare and submit to the Ministry the program and budget of the Agency; and 
implement same upon approval; 
(d) effect expenditure in accordance with the budget approved for the Agency; 
(e) represent the Agency in all its dealings with third parties; 
(f) prepare and submit to the Ministry the activity and financial reports of the Agency. 
4) The General Manager may delegate part of his powers and duties to the employees of the 
Agency to the extent necessary for the efficient performance of the activities of the Agency; 
provided, however, that in the case of an employee who acts on behalf of the General 
Manager for more than thirty days. Prior approval of the Minister shall be required. 
8. Budget 
1) The budget of the Agency shall be drawn from the following sources: 
(a) government subsidy; 
(b) license fees; 
(c) any other source. 
2) The fund referred to in sub-Article (1) of this Article shall be deposited in a bank account 
opened in the name of the Agency and be expended for the carrying out of the activities of the 
Agency. 
9. Books of Accounts 
1) The Agency shall keep complete and accurate books of accounts. 
2) The books of accounts and other financial documents of the Agency shall be audited 
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annually by the Auditor General or by an auditor designated by him. 
 
PART THREE 
REQUIREMENT AND CONDITIONS OF LICENCE 
10. Operator’s License 
1) No person may operate a telecommunication service without obtaining licence from 
the Agency. 
2) No license shall be required for the use of telecommunication systems or 
telecommunication equipment by the police, the armed forces and any other services 
directly employed by the State for national security. 
11. Conditions of License 
1) A license to operate a telecommunication service may be subject to such conditions as 
the Agency considers necessary for promoting the objectives stated in Article 5 of this 
Proclamation. 
2) Without limiting the generality of sub-Article(1) of this Article, a license may include 
the following conditions: 
(a) the provision of services to rural or other specified areas; 
(b) requiring an operator to publish in such manner as may be specified in the license 
a notice stating the charges and other terms and conditions that are to be applicable to 
services provided; 
(c) provision of service on priority basis to the Government or specified organizations; 
(d) criteria for setting tariffs regarding the service ; 
(e) requiring an operator to comply with such technical standards or requirements 
including service performance standards as may be specified in the license. 
3) The Agency may modify any condition of a license if it considers it in the public 
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interest to do so. 
12. Tariffs 
The tariffs applicable to basic telecommunication services shall be studied by the Agency and 
submitted to the Government for approval. 
13. Technical Standards 
1) The Agency may determine technical standards regarding telecommunications 
including customer premises equipment. 
2) Any directive issued for the determination of standard shall be published in such 
manner as the Agency may direct. 
14. Approval of Equipment 
1) The Agency may, by public notice, specify any telecommunication equipment that 
requires the Agency’s approval before it may be connected to a telecommunication 
system; 
2) Without prejudice to sub-Article (1) of this Article, the following equipment require 
the approval of the Agency: 
(a) radio communication equipment; 
(b) TVRO 
3) The Agency shall consider the following criteria in approving types of 
telecommunication equipment: 
(a) safety to life and health; 
(b) maintenance of the telecommunication network including conditions regarding 
data protection; 
(c) electromagnetic compatibility; 
(d) appropriate use of electromagnetic frequency spectrum; 
(e) interpretability between the telecommunication equipment and the 
telecommunications networks; 
(f) other considerations which the Agency may determine by directives. 
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4) It is prohibited to manufacture, import or distribute, without obtaining prior approval, 
telecommunications equipment that require the approval of the Agency. 
15. Radiocommunications 
1) The Agency shall be responsible for the management and authorization of the use of 
frequencies allocated to Ethiopia in accordance with international conventions. 
2) No person shall, except in accordance with a permit obtained from the Agency, 
possess, install or operate radiocommunication apparatus. 
3) The provisions of sub-Article (2) of this Article shall not be applicable to radio 
apparatus for use by the police, the armed forces and any other services directly 
employed by the State. 
16. Assignment of Frequency 
1) The Agency may assign frequencies to be used for telecommunications, 
radiocommunication services and radio and television broadcasting; 
2) The Agency shall coordinate the use of frequencies both locally and internationally; 
and monitor the proper use of same; 
3) In deciding upon an application for assignment of frequencies, regard shall be made 
to the present use and future needs of the Country; 
4) Frequencies may be assigned to different persons on time-sharing basis. 
17. Power to Inspect 
1) The Agency may assign inspectors to ascertain that the requirements of this 
Proclamation and its decisions made hereunder are complied with. 
2) An inspector assigned pursuant to sub-Article (1) of this Article, may enter and 
inspect, during working hours, the premises of a telecommunication operator or any 
place on which he believes on reasonable grounds there is any radio apparatus. 
3) An inspector shall have the power to inspect any telecommunication equipment and to 
examine and make copies of any relevant documents. 
4) An inspector shall show his identification card before entering any place for 
inspection. 
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PART FOUR 
USE OF LAND AND BUILDINGS 
FOR TELECOMMUNICATION LINES 
18. The Use of Land and Buildings 
1) Any telecommunication operator may enter any land and perform all acts necessary 
for the purpose of installing, repairing, improving, examining and altering or 
removing a telecommunication line. 
2) Where a telecommunication line is essentially to pass upon any building the 
telecommunication operator may install such line in such manner that the installation 
shall in no way damage the building. 
3) Any telecommunication operator may cut down any tree or branch which may in any 
way cause damage to or is likely to impede a telecommunication line. 
4) Before entering any place for purposes specified in sub- Article (1) or (2) of this 
Article, an operator shall give a ten – day written notice to the possessor of the land or 
owner of the building stating the nature of the acts intended to be done. 
5) If the possessor of the land or the owner of the building has any objection against the 
performance of the intended act, he may lodge his objection with the Agency within 
the notice period specified under sub-Article (4) of this Article. 
6) The Agency may upon giving each party an opportunity to be heard, uphold the 
objection or authorize, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it thinks 
fit, the performance of the intended acts. 
19. Removal or Alteration of Telecommunication Line 
1) The possessor of land or the owner of a building used by an operator for the 
installation of a telecommunication line pursuant to Article 18 of this Proclamation 
may, if he has good cause, apply to the Agency requesting the removal or alteration of 
the telecommunication line. 
2) Upon ascertaining the existence of good cause in submitting an application under sub 
Article (1) of this Article and the existence of alternatives for the installation of the 
telecommunication line, the Agency may order the removal of the line or the 
alteration of its position. 
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20. Compensation 
1) A telecommunication operator shall be liable for the payment of fair compensation to 
the possessor of land or the owner of a building to whom it has inflicted damages in 
the course of exercising its power to use land or building. 
2) A person who has caused the removal or alteration of a telecommunication line 
pursuant to Article 19 of this Proclamation shall be liable for the payment of fair 
compensation to the telecommunication operator. 
21. Compulsory Acquisition of Land 
An operator may compulsorily acquire any privately possessed lands for public use in 
accordance with the law. 
 
 
PART FIVE 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
22. Town Plans 
1) Any town Plan shall clearly indicate lines of telecommunication networks. 
2) Any telecommunication operator shall follow the town plan in installing a 
telecommunication line. 
23. Other constructions 
1) Any construction or excavation work or permanent fixtures of any nature in the 
vicinity of a telecommunication line shall require the prior consent of the 
telecommunication operator. 
2) The telecommunication operator shall have the duty to respond, within thirty days, to 
a request submitted to it pursuant to sub-Article (1) of this Article. 
3) Where the telecommunication operator unduly withholds its consent, the Agency may 
authorize the carrying out of the activities referred to in sub-Article(1) of this Article 
where it ascertains that they will not cause damage or any impediment to the 
telecommunication line. 
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4) Any construction work or fixtures of permanent nature shall be at least two meters 
away from the installation of a telecommunication line; 
5) When any construction work is hindering an existing telecommunication line, the 
operator may, by giving thirty days notice, request the owner or the possessor to 
remove it. 
6) If the owner or possessor fails to remove the construction work, the operator shall 
have the right to remove it. 
7) 24. Prohibitions 
1) No person is allowed to connect or disconnect telecommunication lines other than 
authorized employees of an operator or a person licensed by the Agency. 
2) The use of call-back service is prohibited. 
25. Penalties 
1) Any person who has contravened the provisions of Article 15(2) or 24(2) of this 
Proclamation shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment from two to five years 
and with fine not exceeding Birr 10,000. 
2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-Article (1) of this Article, any radio 
communication apparatus, a TVRO or any other telecommunication equipment that 
require the authorization of the Agency shall be forfeited to the Agency if found in the 
possession of a person who has not obtained the necessary approval from the Agency. 
3) Any person who contravenes other provisions of this Proclamation shall be punished 
in accordance with the Penal Code. 
26. Repeal 
The following are hereby repealed: 
1) the Declaration of Telephones Proclamation No. 55/1944; 
2) the Maintenance of Telephone Services Proclamation No. 114/1950; 
3) the Imperial Board of Telecommunications establishment Proclamation No. 131/1952. 
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Effective Date 
This Proclamation shall enter into force as of the 28
th
 day of November, 1996. 
Done at Addis Ababa, this 28
th
 day of November, 1996. 
Negaso Gidada (Dr.)  
President of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia 
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APPENDIX B 
 
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS REGULATIONS NO. 47/1999 
Council of Ministers Regulations To Provide for the Regulation of Telecommunication 
Services 
These Regulations are issued by the Council of Ministers pursuant to Article 5 of the 
Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia Proclamation No.4/1995. 
 
PAR T ONE 
General 
1. Short Title 
        These Regulations may be cited as the "Telecommunication Services Council of 
Ministers Regulations No. 47/1999." 
2. Definitions 
        1) Definitions provided under the Telecommunication Proclamation No. 49/1996 shall 
apply to these Regulations. 
      2) In these Regulations, unless the context requires otherwise: 
(a) "Agency" means the Ethiopian Telecommunications 
Agency; 
(b) "Licensee" means the holder of telecommunication service 
license issued under these Regulations; 
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(c) "Local Network" includes the local exchange, the junction 
network and the access network; 
(d) "Priority Customers Target" means a target indicating the 
total number of new exchange lines to be brought into 
service for priority customers to be specified by the Agency; 
(e) "Public Call Office Target" means a target indicating the 
total number and regional distribution of new public call 
offices to be brought into service; 
(f) "Public Pay Phone Target" means a target indicating the 
number of coin or card operated telephones to be brought 
into service; 
(g) "Public Switched Telecommunication Network" includes 
the Local Network, the National Long Distance Network 
and the International Network; 
(h) "Public Switched Telecommunication Service" means any 
service to be provided using Public Switched 
Telecommunication Network; 
(i) "Roll-out Target" means telecommunication service 
expansion target to be set by the Agency and may include 
Public Pay Phone Target, Under-Serviced Line Target, 
Priority Customers Target and Public Call Office Target; 
(j) "Telecommunication Service License" includes public 
switched telecommunication service license, cellular mobile 
service license, internet service license and data 
communication service license; 
(k) ''Service Target" means a target to be set by the Agency 
regarding the provision of quality of service by the licensee; 
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(l) "Under-serviced Line Target" means a target indicating the 
total number of new exchange lines to be brought into 
service for zonal and woreda and other towns of the regional 
states lacking the provision of telecommunication service. 
 
PART TWO 
Telecommunication Service 
License 
3. Application for license 
         1) Application for telecommunication service license shall be  
            in the form prescribed by the Agency and shall contain: 
(a) identity and address of the applicant; 
(b) documents showing the applicant's financial situation, 
technical competence and experience; 
(c). such other information the Agency may determine by 
directives 
2) Information provided to the Agency pursuant to the provisions of this Article shall 
be confidential. 
4. Grant of License 
    1) The Agency shall, upon payment by the applicant of the prescribed fees, grant the 
requested license within 90 days of the submission of the application; provided, however, that 
no license shall be granted unless the Agency is satisfied that the applicant has the required 
technical competence, financial resource and experience to fulfill the obligations relating to 
the license requested. 
    2) No license shall be granted under these Regulations unless the applicant is eligible to 
invest in the sector pursuant to the provisions of the relevant investment law. 
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5. Refusal of License 
     
i. If the Agency determines that the application or the information supplied or the 
qualifications, experience or financial capacity of the applicant in connection with 
the proposed license is materially inadequate in relation to the criteria set by the 
Agency, it shall so notify the applicant in writing setting the reasons of its decision. 
ii. The applicant shall be permitted to consult with the Agency in order to provide all 
evidence in support of its position, shall be afforded a time not less than 30 days to 
overcome the objection of the Agency and shall be entitled to amend or complete its 
application. 
iii. If, following such consultation and expiry of such time, the Agency still believes that 
the application or the information supplied or the qualification of the applicant are 
materially inadequate to justify the grant of license, it shall so notify the applicant in 
writing. 
6. Contents of a License 
    A telecommunication license, shall as may be appropriate, specify: 
    1) the name of the licensee; 
    2) the installation to which it applies and location of such installation; 
    3) the service in respect of which it is issued; 
    4) Roll-out target; and, 
    5) Service Target. 
7. Duties of Licensee 
    A licensee shall: 
i. fulfill the Roll-out Target and Service Target specified in the license; 
ii. publish the charges and other terms and conditions specifying the method which is to 
be adopted for determining the charges that are applicable to its services other than 
Basic Telecommunication Service; 
iii. maintain its telecommunication installations in such condition so as to provide safe, 
adequate and efficient service; 
iv. allow access to the Agency to its installations; 
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v. furnish to the Agency such report, documents and information concerning its 
installations and operations as the Agency may request; 
vi. continue to apply the existing numbering plan until the Agency prescribes a new 
numbering plan. 
8. Amendment of License 
i. The Agency may amend the license upon request of the licensee where it  
    finds the request justifiable. 
ii. The Agency may, on its own initiatives, amend a license if it considers the amendment 
to     be necessary for reason of public interest; provided, however, that such amendment 
shall     not substantially affect- the operational and financial viability of the licensee. 
9. Duration of License 
    1) The duration of a license for Public Switched Telecommunication Service may  
    not exceed 25 years. 
    2) The duration of a license for cellular mobile service may not exceed 10 years. 
    3) The duration of a license for internet service may not exceed 10 years. 
    4) The duration of a license for data communication service may not exceed 10   years. 
10. Renewal of License 
    A license may be renewed for successive periods, if the licensee: 
1) has submitted to the Agency a renewal application together with its business plan at 
least six months prior to the expiry of the license; is not in breach of any provisions 
of the Telecommunication Proclamation No. 49/1996, these Regulations and 
directives issued hereunder which constitute grounds for revocation of its license; 
and 
2) agrees to upgrade its operations by replacing outdated technology with new 
technology;     provided, however, that the duration of each renewal shall not exceed 
half of the initial period of the license. 
11. Revocation of License 
        1) The Agency may a license where the licensee: 
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(a) has failed to fulfill the Roll-out Target or Service Target 
specified in the license; 
(b) failed to follow the technical standards applicable to the service; 
(c) violates the tariff set by the government; or 
(d) in transgression of the Law: 
(i) provides inferior service; 
(ii) violates public interest. 
2) No revocation of license shall be mde by the Agency unless the licensee has been given 
adequate opportunity by the Agency to rectify the situation or failure. 
12. Termination of License 
1) A license shall terminate if:         
a) it is not renewed pursuant to Article 10 of these Regulations;  
b) it is revoked by the Agency pursuant to Article 11 of these Regulations; or 
c) the licensee is declared bankrupt or dissolved. 
2) Upon termination of a license the Government may take over, in consideration of 
compensation on the basis of book value or replacement cost whichever is lower, the 
facilities of the licensee which are absolutely necessary to continue, without interruption, the 
telecommunication service. 
3) If the Government does not desire to take over the facilities, the licensee may be obliged to 
remove such facilities at its own cost. 
13. Fees 
        1) Fees to be paid for the issuance of license shall be as follows: 
(a) for Public Switched Telecommunication 
Service . Birr 200,000 
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(b) for cellular mobile service Birr 200,000 
(c) for internet service, Birr 100,000 
(d) for data communication service ...Birr 100,000 
Fees to be paid for the amendment, upon request of 
the licensee, or renewal of a license shall be 50% 
of the fee required for the issuance of such license. 
2) The fees under this Article shall not include fees to be paid for frequency allocation. 
 
PART THREE 
Telecommunication Service 
Price and Tariff 
14. Scope of Application 
1) The provisions of this part shall apply to the price and tariff of Basic 
Telecommunication Service. 
2) The provisions of this part shall also serve as criteria for setting, by the licensee, 
the price and tariff of telecommunication services other than Basic 
Telecommunication Service. 
15. General Principles 
1) Telecommunication service pricing shall be based on the principles of economic 
efficiency, public interest and economic viability of the operations of the service. 
2) Costs shall be allocated to customers proportional to the burden they impose on 
the system with the exception of costs incurred to provide Basic Telecommunication 
Service for under-serviced areas. 
3) The tariff level shall be sufficient enough to ensure the sustainability of service 
provision and the attraction of fresh investment in the sector. 
4) The tariff structure shall consider differential rates induced by the elasticity of 
demand and the varying demand schedules of services. 
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16. General Pricing Approach 
    Telecommunication service prices shall be set on the basis of:  
    1) the system's marginal cost; and 
    2) optimum system planning. 
17. Telecommunication Access Service Pricing 
1) The telecommunications access services cost shall be determined on the basis of the 
cost attributed to the network access component.  
2) The connection fee shall be computed on the basis of the marginal invested capital cost 
attributed to the access network; provided, however, that such cost shall not include the 
cost of customer premises equipment. 
3) The rental fee shall be computed on the basis of the marginal cost attributed to upkeep 
and maintain the access network. 
18. Telecommunication Call Service Pricing 
1) The call service cost shall be determined on the basis of the cost attributed to the network 
component. 
2) In cases where a given network is employed for the joint use of various call service groups 
the cost shall be proportioned on the basis of assigning a share of the common capacity cost. 
3) A marginal call service cost shall be computed for each call service. 
4) Long distance and international call service rates shall be time and distance sensitive 
where distance is a factor. 
19. Other Charges 
Other charges applicable to Basic Telecommunication Service may be effected in accordance 
with a contractual agreement between the licensee and customers subject to the approval of 
the Agency. 
20. Tariff Revision 
Tariff revision shall be conducted whenever compelling circumstances occur; provided, 
however, that the maximum time between intervals may not exceed four years. 
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21. Books of Accounts 
A licensee shall keep books of accounts of its operation based on generally   
accepted accounting principles and guidelines of the Agency. 
i. The licensee shall submit audited reports of its accounts to the Agency within six 
months from the end of the Government's fiscal year. 
 
PART FOUR 
Technical Standards 
Chapter One 
General 
22. Technology Choice  
i. The technology to be employed in the different parts of the telecommunication 
networks shall be selected by considering future developments in telecommunications 
and customer service requirements. In particular, it shall be digital, field proven, and 
shall employ the latest techniques in the field of telecommunications. 
ii. All telecommunications equipment to be used shall be compatible to the existing 
network system. 
23. System Modularity 
Telecommunication systems shall have a high degree of modularity so that new services and 
features could be implemented with minimum changes in hardware and/ or software. 
24. System Configuration 
Telecommunications systems and networks shall employ redundant or duplicated 
configurations so that failure on circuit element or component may not affect the overall 
performance of the system. 
25. Reliability and Performance 
i. The performance of individual components and units of equipment and the system as 
a whole shall ensure very high standard of reliability. 
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ii. Mean failure rates, mean time to repair faults and mean time between failures for the 
different parts of the system and for the whole system shall be in compliance with the 
standard set by the Agency. 
26. Equipment Dimensioning 
    Equipment Dimensioning shall consider the following:     
i. avoidance of major disturbances in handling overload traffic; 
ii. minimizing dial tone and call setup delay under normal and over load condition; and 
iii. maintaining appropriate level of service. 
27. Signaling Systems 
i. Modern signaling systems which are flexible and having additional features shall be 
used whenever technically possible. 
ii. Inter-working between the different signaling systems and backward compatibility 
shall be guaranteed. 
iii. The technical requirements for the different signaling systems to be used in the 
national network shall be in accordance with the existing signaling systems. 
28. Safety Requirements     
i. Flammable material shall not be used in any telecommunications equipment. 
ii. Protection arrangements shall be provided to ensure human safety when equipment 
voltage and/ or current are at the level dangerous to human life. 
iii. Harmful radiation due to radio frequency, heating, harmful ionization or optical 
radiation shall be protected to ensure human safety. Radioactive materials shall never 
be put into use. 
29. Protection of Telecommunications Equipment     
i. Grounding system for equipment and antenna supporting structure shall be  
    made properly. 
ii. All metallic enclosures of electrical equipment, racks, wave-guides, and outer 
conductors of coaxial feeder shall be secured and connected to the grounding system. 
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iii. Lightening protections shall be provided for telecommunication equipment whenever 
deemed necessary. 
iv. Proper overvoltage and overcurrent protections shall be provided for all 
telecommunication equipment. 
v. All metal parts of the telecommunication equipment and system shall be protected 
against corrosion. 
vi. The electronics part of the telecommunication equipment shall be protected from dust. 
vii. Air conditioning shall be provided for telecommunications equipment, where deemed 
necessary. 
30. Marking of Telecommunication Equipment   
i. Each unit and parts of any telecommunication equipment shall have type, model and 
serial number clearly and suitably labeled. 
ii. Any electrical and electronics components of telecommunication equipment shall be 
clearly marked and shall be provided a detailed component data. 
iii. High voltage parts of telecommunication equipment shall be clearly marked. 
31. Electromagnetic Interference 
The permissible level of electromagnetic interference shall be in accordance with directives 
of the Agency to be issued pursuant to Sub-Article (3) of Article 52 of these Regulations. 
32. Environmental Conditions 
All telecommunication equipment shall be able to operate in the environmental conditions 
specified by the Agency. 
33. Power System  
i. Power system design and performance shall be consistent with the over all  system 
performance requirements. 
ii. The direct current power supplies voltage for all telecommunication equipment shall 
be negative 48 volts. 
iii. The power supply system shall include rectifiers, common control equipment and a 
floating battery bank connected across the rectifiers.  
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iv. The rectifiers shall be designed with a minimum of 50% reserve capacity. 
v. In places where commercial power supply is not available, there shall be a solar 
power system to provide the necessary power required by telecommunication 
equipment. 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Technical Standards for Public Switched 
Telecommunication Network 
34. General 
    Any telecommunication equipment shall comply with the International 
Telecommunications Union Recommendations, Regulations and Standards. 
35. Digital Trunk and Junction Network 
    Digital trunk and junction network interface shall be in accordance with the international 
standard adopted by the Agency. 
36. Radio Transmission Equipment     
i. The geographical coordinates of every radio station should be clearly indicated. 
ii. Major transmission systems shall be provided with a service channel which could be 
used for communication is and transfer of information. 
iii. Digital multiplexing hierarchies and techniques shall be based on the international 
standard adopted by the agency. 
37. Antenna and Antenna Supporting Structures     
i. Every antenna and antenna supporting structure, including the antenna system shall 
be     strong enough to resist the highest wind pressure expected in the area of 
installation. 
ii. Where necessary, signal lighting system and reflective paints shall be affixed to the 
tops of antenna supporting structures in conformity with directives of the Agency. 
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38. Customer Premises Equipment  
i. Customer premises equipment shall be compatible with the existing system. 
ii. The Agency shall issue detailed technical standards for customer premises equipment. 
39. Cable Network Design 
    The design of cable network shall aim at optimum service provision taking  
    quality, flexibility, reliability, economy and maintainability into consideration. 
40. Underground Cable Installation 
Safety guards and other proper warning devices shall be provided in all underground 
cable installations in accordance with the directives-of the Agency. 
41. Aerial Cable Installation   
i. Aerial cables shall be able to withstand transversal wind pressure in the area 
of installation. 
ii. The maximum pole span shall not exceed 50 meters without any strengthening 
measures for keeping the required strength. 
iii. The allowable sag of aerial cables shall be limited to less than 0.8 meters at an 
ambient temperature of 45°C under windless situation. 
iv. The minimum clearance between ground surface and the aerial cable including drop 
wires shall be at least 4.5 meters; provided, however, that the minimum clearance 
at road crossings may not be less than 6 meters. 
v. The clearance between telecommunication and power cables shall be determined in 
accordance with this Electricity Operations Council of Ministers Regulations No. 
47/1999. 
42. Cross Connection Cabinet Installation 
i. Cross connection cabinets shall be placed on the side walk away from the carriage 
way in such a way that public inconvenience could be minimized and any damage to 
the cabinets could be avoided. 
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ii. Cabinets shall be properly locked and protected from traffic by suitable protecting 
mechanisms. 
43. Drop Wire Installation     
i. The sag of one pair of drop wire shall not exceed 0.4 meters under an ambient 
temperature of 45°C. 
ii. Abe drop wires shall be covered with adequate insulated protector. 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
     Cellular Mobile Network 
44. General 
    1) The cellular mobile network system of the licensee shall be digital and be capable of 
providing: 
       (a) comprehensive range of data, short messages and supplementary services; and  
       (b) roaming facility. 
    2) Technical standards for cellular mobile network shall be in accordance with  
        the international standard adopted by the Agency. 
45. Connection to the Public Switched Telecommunication Network 
    The interface with the Public Switched Telecommunication Network shall be made  
    via digital links and shall use signaling system No. 7 according to 
     International Telecommunications Union Recommendations. 
46. Frequency Al10cation 
    The licensee shall operate the cellular mobile service within the designated  
    frequency bandwidth and shall use only the spectrum specifically allocated to it by  
    the Agency. 
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PART FIVE 
Telecommunications Service Standards And 
Roll-out Target 
47. Service Targets 
    1). The Service target indicators shall be prescribed by the Agency in consultation with 
the licensee. 
    2) Service target indicators may include the following: 
        (a) number of telecommunication line faults per line per annum; 
        (b) percentage of line faults cleared within: 
            (i) 8 working hours, 
            (ii) 40 working hours, 
            (iii) more than 40 working hours, 
        (c) percentage of public payphones in operation in a given period of time; 
        (d/ percentage of reduction of existing waiting list in a specified period of time. 
48. Customer Support Services 
    1) The licensee shall establish procedures for efficient customers support services. 
    2) Bills to be issued to customers shall clearly indicate the type of service and the units 
for which charges are made. 
    3) All fault reporting calls shall be free of charge.  
49. Rol1-out Target 
i. Roll-out Target setting shall be carried out based on the national 
telecommunication development policy and priorities set forth by the Government. 
ii. Without limiting the generality of sub-article (1) of this Article the Agency shall, in 
setting the Roll-out Target, take into-account: 
            (a) the growth of telephone penetration rate; 
            (b) the reduction of long waiting list; 
            (c) the extension of telephone services to rural areas; 
            (d) the provision of new and enhanced services; 
            (e) the creation of a modern and reliable national network; and  
            f)the business plan of the licensee. 
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50. Emergency Ca11 Services 
i. All calls to fire brigades, ambulance services, police stations and other organizations 
providing assistance to the public in emergencies which are determined as such by the 
Agency, shall be free of charge. 
ii. Special numbers shall be assigned for emergency call services. 
iii. Appropriate emergency call service facilities shall be installed on main highways at 
an interval of 50 kilo meters when circumstances so warrant. The use of such facilities 
shall be free of charge. 
51. Directory Service  
i. The licensee shall issue, printed directories to be provided to customers free of charge, 
within periods of intervals to be specified by the Agency. 
ii. The licensee shall provide customers with online directory services. 
 
PART SIX 
Management Of Frequencies 
And Radio Regulations 
52. National Frequency A110cation Plan 
    1) The Agency shall prepare a national frequency allocation plan. 
    2) The national frequency allocation plan shall, in particular: 
       (a) define how radio frequencies are used; 
       (b) aim at ensuring that the radio frequency spectrum is utilized and managed in an 
orderly, efficient and effective manner; 
       (c) avoid obstacles to the introduction of new technologies and telecommunication 
services. 
    3) The Agency shall issue directives on radio regulations. 
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53. Granting of Permit for Use of Frequencies 
i. The installation and use of radio communication equipment shall only be authorized 
if, the holder of the equipment has obtained a permit for the use of frequencies, and 
they are in     compliance with directives of the Agency to be issued pursuant to Sub-
Article (3) of Article 52 of these Regulations. 
ii. The fees to be paid by frequency spectrum users shall be fixed by directives of the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
54. Registration of Frequencies 
Upon assigning frequencies to a transmitting or receiving station all technical and operational 
data indicating the spectrum and geographical coordinates shall be entered in the national 
frequency register to be kept by the Agency. 
55. Frequencies A110cated for Broadcasting Services 
The provisions of this Part and directives of the Agency to be issued on radio regulations 
shall be applicable to frequencies allocated for broadcasting services without affecting 
the powers given to the Ethiopian Broadcast Agency under the provisions of other relevant 
laws. 
 
PART SEVEN 
Miscellaneous 
56. Interconnection    
i. A licensee shall interconnect its telecommunication system to the telecommunication 
system of such other licensee. 
ii. The technical inter-operability and availability conditions shall be fully conducive for 
interconnection. 
iii. An agreement relating to the interconnection shall be entered into by the licensees. 
iv. The Agency shall issue directives relating to interconnections. Such directives shall 
determine, among others: 
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 (a) the time limit for interconnections; 
(b) the technical conditions and the quality of service to be provided through 
interconnections; 
(c) fees and costs of interconnections. 
v. Any dispute arising between licensees in the course of negotiation for interconnection 
shall be referred to the Agency for arbitration. The decision of the Agency shall be 
final and binding. 
57. Power to Issue Directives 
Without prejudice to the powers given to the Agency by these Regulations, the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications shall have the power to issue directives necessary for the 
proper implementation of these Regulations. 
58. Transitory Provisions 
i. The existing telecommunication service operator shall, within twelve months from 
the  effective date of these Regulations, obtain the required licenses to be issued in 
accordance with these Regulations. 
ii. The requirements provided for under part 4 of these Regulations with regard to 
choice of technology and specific technical standards, shall only be applicable to 
new installations to be brought into service after the effective date of these 
Regulations. 
59. Effective Date  
   These Regulations shall enter into force on the date of their publication in the  
    Federal Negarit Gazeta. 
 
Done at Addis Ababa this 27
th
 day of April, 1999. 
MELES ZENAWI 
PRIME MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA 
